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How
Washington Got
Its Act Together
by ANTHONY

J. HOPE / Associate Director, Washington Service Center

T

hroughout the 1980 presidential
campaign, candidate Ronald
Reagan argued against regulatory clutter—contending that the only
way to boost American productivity is
to free business from unnecessarily
complex and contradictory tax policy
regulations, and paperwork. Simple,
straightforward, and predictable
regulations, he maintained, is the only
acceptable alternative.
To Washington watchers, this rhetoric
was not new; but there was a difference this time, one of record. As
governor of California, Ronald Reagan
had demonstrated his willingness to
fight the legislature and the bureaucrats
in the effort to unburden business from
unneeded regulation. He didn't win
that war, but he won many battles.
And he never, ever gave up the fight.
The draft of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was remarkable in
that it was an uncluttered attempt to
stimulate the economy through tax
cuts—the first such attempt since the
Kennedy years. What was equally
remarkable was that ERTA had its
genesis in 1978 as a Republican alternative to President Carter's ill-fated tax
proposal. A brief look at the history of
the Revenue Act of 1978 and ERTA
will help in understanding how the
Congress arrived at the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and
where we may be going from here.
What Went Wrong in 7 8

been dangerous for the majority party
since its members traditionally have lost
seats to the underdogs. The Hill
leadership wanted the same type of
legislation they had been getting for
years: sock the rich, help the poor, and
quietly give the rich enough complex
loopholes to keep the large campaign
contributions flowing. But a growing
minority on the Hill was trying a new
approach—a comprehensive tax cut to
stimulate the staggering economy.
What the Carter administration
brought to the Hill was a grab bag of
political issues that most observers
thought would help neither the
Democrats at the polls nor the economy. It was no secret that President
Carter disdained Washington and didn't
understand the process. His threemartini-lunch proposal typifies how not
to manage legislative issues. Cutting
back on business's fringe benefits
always has been a popular reelection
rallying cry. What the Carter people
didn't know is that you can talk for
months about the health benefits of
avoiding booze and cholesterol, or the
fiscal benefits of raising revenue by
eliminating deductions, but the reality
is that such measures are rarely put to a
vote. Those running for reelection
refused to be put in the dilemma of
having to vote one way or the other on
this issue. They didn't want to alienate
businessmen, restaurateurs, restaurant
worker's unions, and credit card companies. Nor did they want to be viewed

The Democrats were in firm control of
both the House and the Senate in 1978.
But mid-term elections always have
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as favoring three-martini lunches.
Nonetheless, Carter's tax team came
to the Hill armed with press releases to
show that the president opposed big
businessmen and supported the little
guy. It took the leadership of both
parties in both houses months to
quietly kill the measure.
The rest of the 1978 effort was not
much better. The few capital formation
incentives emerged muddled; there
were a few good points, but no
coherent policy. In November, the
Republicans gained 12 House seats,
three Senate seats, and six governorships. It was an average mid-term result.
How the Good Guys Won
While the battle over the 1978 Revenue
Act was being waged, three Washington tax lobbyists began meeting for breakfast every Tuesday at
the Sheraton Carlton Hotel to share
ideas. They knew that a comprehensive
tax bill was needed, and they knew that
the capital formation incentives in the
proposed act were insufficient. Calling
themselves the Carlton Group, these
lobbyists decided to forget 78 and to
plan for 1981.
Charls E. Walker, the group's leader,
was then chairman of Governor
Reagan's tax policy task force and once
had been the deputy secretary of the
Treasury Ernest S. Christian, a tax expert
at the Washington law firm of Patton,
Boggs & Blow, had formulated the first
drafts of a 10-5-3 depreciation schedule
proposed three years before, when he
was deputy assistant secretary of the
Treasury for tax policy. While not
accepted then, the depreciation measure was dusted off and resurrected
three years later. Richard Rahn,
currently the chief economist for the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, once was
the chief of the American Council for
Capital Formation. The nominal lineup
of the coalition was Walker for Republicans, Christian for Democrats, and
Rahn for business.
After the 1978 bill was passed, the
group was joined by two powerful
members of the House Ways and
Means Committee, James R. Jones
(D-Okla.) and William Steiger (R-Wisc),
who sensed the need for a tax bill that
was a tool for a strong economy rather
than a vehicle for reelection. They
36

lamented, however, that the businessmen were more divided about what
was needed than the politicians. Those
in the Northeast, for example, were
fighting those in the Sunbelt; it was
incentives for new construction versus
those for rehabilitation. Simililarly big
business was squaring off against small
business over capitalizing research and
development. Jones and Steiger (later
replaced by Barber Conable) joined
the group with the understanding that
its goal had to be to unite business
behind a single conceptual framework.
When Ronald Reagan was elected, he
brought that framework with him in the
form of supply-side economics. A clean,

comprehensive bill was prepared.
Everyone understood that compromises
and concessions with the Democraticcontrolled House would clutter the bill,
but all expected minimal damage.
David Stockman, director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and
Donald Regan, the Treasury secretary,
led the administration team; Bob Dole
guided in the Senate; Barber Conable
directed the Republican minority in the
House; and the Carlton Group was
charged with holding the business
community lobbies together. The only
conflict amongst them was whether
supply-side economics would work
well enough on the economy that the

The Congressional Lobbyist
Comes ofAge
A

s recently as 25 years ago, the
- popular image of the Washington lobbyist was one of an old man
in a baggy suit and brown fedora
w h o lurked in Capitol Hill bars with
a paper bag stuffed w i t h wrinkled
twenties. All this has changed.
Lobbyists not only have cleaned up
their acts, but through an interwoven
series of three events they have
emerged as the single most powerful
force on Capitol Hill.
The first of these three events was
the proliferation of federal programs. By
the 1960s, the residue of New Deal
programs and the decision to never
again dismantle the military machine
were taxing the power of Congress to
manage its affairs. Then came the war
in Vietnam and President Johnson's
Great Society We would have "guns
and butter," and a tripling of the
bureaucracy needed to procure and
manage them. The programs were so
big and came so fast that Congress's
committee system short-circuited.

coherent legislative direction.
The second event was the proliferation of paper in the method of
gathering information for the congressional decision making process. In less
complex times, appropriate agency
officials would be called to testify
before congressional committees
concerning their agencies' past or
intended actions. During the McCarthy
era, the process became more confrontational, as the executive branch
officials tried to protect themselves
from attack. During the sixties and
seventies the situation further deteriorated as the Vietnam and Watergate
experiences raised new barriers to
communication. Congressional
committees began to develop their
own information through new, permanent investigative staffs. Committee
meetings erupted into battles between
congressional aides wielding stacks of
photocopied charts and executive
branch officials protecting their turf
with charts and printouts of their own.

The power war among committees
for jurisdiction over the new programs
left in its wake a protracted confusion
within the programs and a lack of

Meanwhile, computers and copiers
produced so much paper that the staffs
found themselves unable to absorb and
synthesize the data needed for congressional decisions. Congress had lost
confidence in the testimony of the

budget could be balanced by 1984
without making massive defense cuts.
The bill's passage by the Senate
seemed a foregone conclusion, but
passage by the House came easier than
expected because the conservative
southern Democrats threatened mutiny
within the party if the House didn't
support the new president's plan.
But time was working against them.
They expected a bill in March, then
April, but there was no action. Finally, in
late May, the boat began to rock. As the
recession broadened, projected tax
revenues decreased. The administration
threatened to offset the deepening
deficits by reducing the business tax

cuts. This time, it was business that
reacted swiftly and decisively. The first
week of June became "Lear Jet Week,"
as businessmen poured into Washington to flex their muscles in a
show of unity so strong that they not
only killed any threat of a tax increase
but increased proposed business tax
benefits by as much as $40 billion over
the next 10 years. Democratic opposition was crushed with the final House
vote of 238 to 195 in favor of the bill.

president's people, just as the testimony
became too complex for Congress.
Finally, the power structure that made
Congress's work flow was being
dismantled by the members themselves. Before 1974, the seniority
system allowed the two parties to
rigidly control their management of
committee business through a semipermanent system of allocating power to
senior chairmen. Since 1974, the
committees have elected their own
chairmen, and now an additional layer
of political maneuvering has replaced
the old order. Congress could no longer
manage itself, direct federal programs,
nor synthesize the data it generated.
What was needed was a trustworthy,
off-line information system that would
provide timely, succinct, and accurate
advice on issues. Enter today's congressional lobbyist.

done and to formulate an action plan.
He needs leadership ability to direct the
technicians, legal draftsmen, runners,
and other lobbyists interested in the
same issue. But access to the members
of Congress is the key element.
When the mood of Congress starts to
shift on an issue, the well-cultivated
congressman will call his friend the
lobbyist and warn him of impending
danger. He calls because the lobbyist is
his friend and confidant—maybe even
the godfather of his children. But most
of all, he calls because they have
developed a mutual early warning
system based on complete trust and
integrity. The speed of the legislative
process just before a vote is so great and
so complex that complete trust
between the member and the lobbyist
is vital. Members will sandbag each
other; but a lobbyist won't sandbag a
member unless he is willing to make a
lifelong enemy.

Today's lobbyist is a member of the
Washington professional service corps,
the industry sector which recently has
outstripped the federal government as
the largest employer in the capitol.
He or she is a professional, usually
with a legal or political background,
who represents a client's or organization's interest in matters pending
before Congress. For a substantial fee,
the lobbyist brings three talents to
bear on a client's problem. He needs
judgment to recognize what can be

TEFRA of 1982
The year 1981 passed into history with
David Stockman admitting that there
was a question whether the tax-cut

This is not to say that Congress has
abnegated its responsibility to the hired
guns of Washington. Each issue has
many sides, and the congressman or his
staff aides will get reports from all who
are lobbying for or against an issue, as
well as from many who would enlarge,
contract, or redirect its scope.
Yet, as Sam Rayburn once said, the
first law of Congress is "get reelected,"
and smart members make sure they
have the lobbyists and their PACs
behind them when they need them.
—Anthony ]. Hope

concepts would work. The five months
lost in getting started would translate
into a year or two lost in progress.
Since ERTA, the recession has
deepened, even as inflation has been
brought under control and the prime
rate has come down. The press and
the Democrats have become very
displeased with the results of Reaganomics, moreover, and have seized on
the one attention-getting economic
indicator that has moved out of the
administration's reach—the first doubledigit unemployment in 30 years.
Reaganomics wasn't a failure; it just
wasn't working yet. It never had been
hailed as a quick fix, and its inception
had been delayed. But the federal
deficits were increasing, and the
projected revenues were decreasing.
Still, the president refused to make up
the difference with defense cuts.
The strategy on which the administration decided was a stopgap. While it
would not retreat from the tax cuts of
1981, it would propose revenue measures for 1982 to enhance cash flow,
such as excise tax increases on tobacco
and alcohol. Bob Dole was given the
task of raising the $100 billion needed to
meet the budget short-fall. In exchange,
he was promised by the Reagan staffers
that they would not interfere with the
strategy he chose for raising the revenue.
From the lobbyist's point of view, it
was back to business as usual. If they
wanted the impact against their client
eased, they would have to suggest that
it would be more fair to gore someone
else's client. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) was
passed with much cutting and snipping,
and with little in the way of a coherent
philosophy. The results of the 1982
mid-term elections were predictable:
the Democrats won 26 House seats, no
Senate seats, and around a half dozen
governorships.
For the future, the most interesting
development is that the president has
steadfastly refused to cut defense
spending. If he holds this course, and if
the economy doesn't turn around, 1983
will bring another TEFRA. The philosophy will be to fix the problems with
cash flow until the economy fixes itself. &
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